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Abstract
Despite American presidential rhetoric ex-
tolling the virtues of establishing democracy in
Iran, there has been strong evidence to prove that
this has not been the true intent of the United
States’ foreign policy in the region. Rather, since
1953, the United States’ primary goal in Iran has
been to maintain a regime and environment that
is favorable to the facilitation of American inter-
ests regardless of the regime type. While these
American interests have ranged from oil settle-
ments, the repulsion of communism, containment
of revolutionary sentiment, and others, the basal
objective has remained the same throughout the
period of 1953 to the present. While the 1979 Ira-
nian Revolution proved to be a disruption to the
United States’ ability to maintain their interests
in the region, this paper will argue that the event
did not signify a significant shift in the United
States’ overarching policy of maintaining influ-
ence in Iran from the pre- to post-revolutionary
period.
1. Introduction
America is currently standing at the precipice
of its relationship with Iran. On January 3, 2020,
Iranian general Qasem Soleimani was killed via an
airstrike, assassinated by the United States. This
was a landmark interaction between the two coun-
tries. As the United States and Iran hung on the
brink of war, the world waited to see what the out-
come would be after the U.S.’s blatant attack on
Iranian leadership. Popular opinion in the U.S.
was divided, with some believing that the killing
of Soleimani was necessary retribution for his past
action and others worrying that it would disrupt
the already fragile nature of U.S.-Iranian relations.
It is in the aftermath of this attack, amid global
uncertainty, that I decided to write my thesis on
the history of U.S.-Iranian relations. Importantly,
the killing of Qasem Soleimani was not isolated
from the past. It reflected a long-standing pattern
of U.S. intervention within the country, propelled
by a multitude of reasons. By beginning with the
1953 Coup d’état in Iran, one can see the patterns
of U.S. action in subsequent watershed incidents
within Iran and between the two countries.
2. The 1953 Coup: Origins
The 1953 coup d’état and overthrow of demo-
cratically elected Mohammed Mossadegh and the
subsequent consolidation of power by Moham-
mad Reza Shah demonstrates the initiation of the
United States’ broader policy of American influ-
ence in the region. The event also shows how
the establishment of a regime favorable to Amer-
ica helped facilitate American foreign policy in-
terests of the era such as the repulsion of com-
munism and favorable oil settlements. As declas-
sified documents and public statements through
presidential press releases and newspapers will
show, while overt action and rhetoric are impor-
tant for understanding the public’s reactions to-
wards certain events, covert documents and action
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will demonstrate the true intention of the United
States regarding the 1953 Coup and the subse-
quent events the U.S. directly caused and influ-
enced within Iran.
As the 1953 Coup was unfolding, it was not
immediately evident that foreign powers, such as
the United States and Great Britain, had an inte-
gral role in the overthrow. However, in the subse-
quent days and weeks afterwards, the involvement
of the United States was difficult to deny. In a
declassified, internal Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) document it explains, “enough talkative
people, including many Iranians were privy to
segments of the operation to make it relatively
easy for journalists to reconstruct the coup.”1 The
United States was also identified as an instrument
in the coup by the Soviet newspaper Pravda which
wrote in 1953 that the “United States intrigues
and finances had lain behind earlier stages of the
Shah’s coup.”2 The United States did not acknowl-
edge their role in the 1953 Coup until much later
when the CIA released further documents on the
event in 2013.3 However, it was common knowl-
edge in Iran that the U.S. had a part in the over-
throw of Mossadegh. Not only would this mu-
tual understanding among the Iranian public fo-
ment anti-American sentiment, it would also taint
the Pahlavi government as colluders with foreign
influences within the country.
The takeaway from the 1953 Coup is more
nuanced than the United States simply acting on
their own accord to overthrow Prime Minister
Mossadegh. The operation was not only planned
alongside and aided by Great Britain’s MI6, but
also by Iranian parties with their own motivations
for Mossadegh’s removal. For the United States
to infiltrate and overthrow Mossadegh there neces-
1Central Intelligence Agency, Overthrow of Premier
Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953, Donald
Wilber. The National Security Archive, 1954, 26.
2“Moscow Says U.S. Aided Shah’s Coup,” The New York
Times, August 20, 1953.
3Malcolm Byrne, “CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran
Coup,” The National Security Archive, August 19, 2013.
sitated collaborators within Iranian society. Reli-
gious leaders known as the ulama, Iranian press,
politicians, and others who would also benefit
from the plan aided in the CIA’s mission. Dr.
Donald Wilber’s Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq
of Iran, a declassified CIA history outlining the
coup, serves as a roadmap for understanding in-
ternal collaboration that assisted in the ousting of
Mossadegh. Alongside the United States’ intense
propaganda campaign, directed through the Ira-
nian press by the CIA Art Group, the agency’s
Tehran station was also “authorized to spend one
million rials a week in purchasing the cooperation
of members of the Iranian Majlis.”4 The ulama
were also motivated to act against Mossadegh,
who had sought to reduce their power through-
out his tenure as Prime Minister. The document
also notes how religious leaders, such as Ayatol-
lah Boroujerdi, were motivated by the operation
to make a “pro-Shah statement,” to increase fa-
vorable sentiment towards him.5 Thus, the United
States and Great Britain worked alongside multi-
ple groups in Iranian society who were also mo-
tivated, be it through political, religious, or eco-
nomic reasons, to oust Mossadegh.
3. The 1953 Coup: American Interests
The United States’ motivations for the over-
throw of Mossadegh differed from those of the
internal, Iranian collaborators. Most scholars
take a two-pronged approach when understand-
ing the motivations of the United States in the
1953 Coup.6 First, there is the argument that
the United States intervened to repel communism
from the country as they viewed an encroaching
Tudeh party as a threat to their regional economic
interests and as a quasi-insurgency group backed
4Central Intelligence Agency, Overthrow of Premier
Mossadeq of Iran, 19-20.
5Central Intelligence Agency, Overthrow of Premier
Mossadeq of Iran, 65-66.
6Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, The CIA, and
the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations (New York: The
New Press, 2013), 5.
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by the Soviets. In addition, the U.S. saw the
growing possibility of the Soviets gaining influ-
ence with the Mossadegh government. A declas-
sified CIA document states, “Tudeh support for
the Prime Minister indicates that the Communists
consider that his return to power will best promote
their objectives.”7 The United States viewed Iran
as a struggle between themselves and the Soviet
Union in the broader fight of the Cold War. To
gain Iran as an ally for either side would mean a
greater foothold in the Middle East, which was in-
creasingly becoming a hotbed for proxy wars be-
tween the two nations. The Tudeh party served as
the primary, organized communist threat in the re-
gion and their support of Mossadegh worried U.S.
officials to a great extent.
Only days before the August 1953 Coup oc-
curred, the New York Times reported on Eisen-
hower’s and the United States’ intent on block-
ing communism within the country. This motiva-
tion was known in Iran, whose own citizens and
journalists had been aware of the United States’
interests within the region. In July 1953 the ar-
ticle stated, “Non-communist editorials accused
Mr. Eisenhower of supporting British imperial in-
terests.”8 A noticeable shift in American policy
towards Iran occurred in a flurry of meetings in
the days before the coup. The same Times ar-
ticle highlighted how the Tudeh party, “insisted
on attributing sinister motives to the visit” despite
American statements to the contrary.9
The other concern which prompted the United
States to intervene in Iran was over oil settlements
in the region. This concern is highlighted in a de-
classified State Department document from 1952
which outlines how the British requested aid from
the United States to overthrow the Mossadegh
government, citing their grim outlook on reaching
7Central Intelligence Agency, The Iranian Situation,
Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room.
1953, 3.
8“Eisenhower Draws Fire of Iran Press,” The New York
Times, August 9, 1953, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
9“Eisenhower Draws Fire of Iran Press.”
a favorable oil settlement with the Prime Minis-
ter.10 In addition, the United States had also been
shaken by the growing oil nationalization in Latin
American countries and sought to prevent a simi-
lar occurrence in Iran.11 Initially the United States
rejected the British government’s request and de-
cided to continue trying to settle the oil dispute
with Mossadegh.12 However, with the promise
of increased influence in the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company by helping the British, the Americans
were further incentivized to accept the offer for
covert intervention alongside the British. Even-
tually, they agreed to help orchestrate the coup
against Mossadegh.
Retrospectively, in 1954, Eisenhower spoke
about the Iranian coup a year after its toppling of
the Mossadegh government. “We were faced in
Iran with a situation that was highly dangerous to
the world.”13 He also stated that “the situation in
Iran ‘greatly ameliorated’ as a result of the agree-
ment between that nation’s Government and the
foreign oil companies.”14 It is evident that the sta-
tus of oil and economics in the Middle East was in-
variably linked to the American government’s in-
terest in repelling communism within the region.
The Soviet Union had historically been embroiled
in the oil conflict with Great Britain. The Cold
War served to exacerbate the contentious nature
of the two countries’ relationship within Iran. The
goal of anti-communism is also mentioned specif-
ically in the British request for U.S. aid for the
coup.15 By backing the British in the struggle
for economic hegemony in the region, the United
10Department of State, Proposal to Organize a Coup
d’etat in Iran, Byroade, Freedom of Information Act Elec-
tronic Reading Room. 1952, 2.
11Abrahamian, The Coup, 79.
12Abrahamian, The Coup, 147.
13Joseph Loftus, “Eisenhower Bars Preventive War;
Hopeful on Peace,” The New York Times, August 12, 1954,
ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
14Loftus, “Eisenhower Bars Preventive War; Hopeful on
Peace.”
15Department of State, Proposal to Organize a Coup
d’etat in Iran, 2.
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States was not only aiding their ally and repelling
communism, but also laying a foundation of pro-
West and inherently pro-capitalist sentiment.
So, the overthrow serviced American foreign
policy in two key interests, in addition to begin-
ning the trend of overarching American influence
within Iran. Following the nationalization of oil in
the region, the United States was offered the op-
portunity to directly intervene in Iranian politics
through their operation alongside MI6 and Iranian
collaborators. Following their orchestration of the
1953 coup in Iran, the United States became the
primary foreign influence in the country. This al-
lowed them to begin exercising policy goals which
began in the forms of economic and political in-
terests. Economically, the United States sought to
destroy the goal of Iranian oil nationalization and
gain influence in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
Politically, the United States wished to suppress
communist sentiment within the country as part of
their larger part in the Cold War.
4. Post-Coup: The Shah and the U.S.
In the years post-coup, it would become in-
creasingly apparent that the United States would
prioritize the aid of whatever form of govern-
ment that would best facilitate their interests in
the region. Evidently, despite Eisenhower’s ear-
lier rejection of Mossadegh’s request for eco-
nomic support shortly before the 1953 Coup, he
later accepted Prime Minister Zahedi’s outreach.16
This demonstrates the stark difference between the
United States’ relations between Mossadegh and
Zahedi. Clearly, the United States was more with-
holding to Mossadegh, who had served as a road-
block for the pursuance of U.S. interests in Iran.
In contrast, Zahedi had been installed, in part, by
the United States as a Prime Minister who would
aid in the facilitation of American interests. In the
16“Iran Seems Stunned by Eisenhower Note,” The New
York Times, July 12, 1953, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
Also see Anthony Leviero, “President Pledges Emergency
Relief to Iranian Premier,” The New York Times, September
2, 1953.
years following the 1953 coup, this pattern would
become increasingly apparent in the U.S.’s inter-
actions with the Shah.
In the period following the overthrow of
Mossadegh, the United States worked to shape the
Iranian government into one that supported Amer-
ican involvement within the country. One can an-
alyze the interactions between Mohammad Reza
Shah and U.S. government officials as evidence
for the United States’ motivation. As David Col-
lier explains, “The United States supported and
funded the shah’s efforts to centralize power and
took action to protect his reign from other possi-
ble threats.”17 In moments where the Shah tried to
subvert U.S. interests and either ignore attempted
policy reform pushes by U.S. government offi-
cials or enter into talks with the Soviet Union,
the United States pulled back on their demands of
the Shah.18 Through the interactions between the
Shah and the United States, one can analyze how
the priority of the United States lay in the main-
tenance of the Pahlavi government, prioritizing a
regime that would create a favorable environment
for U.S. influence rather than one that would pro-
mote democracy.
One of the most striking examples of how the
United States enabled Mohammad Reza Shah’s
continued leadership in Iran is the CIA-assisted
creation and facilitation of the SAVAK. The
SAVAK served as the secret police for the Shah,
arresting and executing dissenters that tried to fo-
ment revolution against his regime. The United
States, motivated to maintain the Shah’s power
and presence in Iran, had aided in its creation. As
Collier explains, “American specialists trained vir-
tually the entire first generation of recruits, who
effectively and mercilessly restricted all forms
of internal opposition.”19 The part that the CIA
17David R. Collier, Democracy and the Nature of Amer-
ican Influence in Iran, 1941-1979, Contemporary Issues in
the Middle East (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University
Press, 2017), 154.
18Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influ-
ence in Iran,177.
19Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influ-
4
Locus: The Seton Hall Journal of Undergraduate Research, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 12
https://scholarship.shu.edu/locus/vol3/iss1/12
played in the SAVAK demonstrates a clear dis-
regard for democracy in the country in favor of
consolidating the power of the Shah. The SAVAK
served an important role in the maintenance of
American interests in the region, enforcing sta-
bility by quashing dissent as well as suppressing
communism by eliminating members of the Tudeh
party. While this damaged the reputation of Amer-
icans from the view of Iranian citizens, it served to
strengthen the trust between the Shah and Amer-
ica.
With the support of and assistance from the
United States government, the Shah worked to-
wards implementing policies that would further
facilitate the actions of the United States within
Iran. However, the intent of American foreign
policy was aimed towards the repulsion of com-
munism and oil settlements rather than the spread
of democracy. Maintaining influence in Iran also
secured the United States important access to the
Persian Gulf, important both economically and
militarily. The United States vied for authoritar-
ian stability rather than veritable democracy as an
unstable Iran would have inhibited the U.S. from
pursuing its goals within the country. Regard-
ing oil interests, the Shah had paved the way for
American companies to take over the oil market.20
In response, $400 million in aid was sent by 1956
from the United States to Iran.21
Granted, there were shortcomings with some
failures to fully implement U.S. policy and ini-
tiatives in Iran on the part of the Shah. As the
Shah continued to consolidate his own power, Col-
lier explains, “the shah ensured that all dissatis-
faction focused on him.”22 However, the United
States government continued to back him, seeing
no other candidate or possibility to improve their
ence in Iran, 161.
20Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influ-
ence in Iran, 157.
21Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influ-
ence in Iran, 157.
22Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influ-
ence in Iran, 165.
influence or status within the region. Understand-
ing the 1953 Coup d’état and the resulting actions
of both the United States and the Iranian govern-
ments can serve as a contributing factor to the oc-
currence of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Paving
the way for the revolution was also growing anger
and distrust towards the Pahlavi Dynasty. The
United States’ intervention within the region and
the government were also important factors con-
tributing to the 1979 revolution as their status as
the leading foreign influence in Iran increased the
public’s anger towards the Shah. The governmen-
tal interference by the United States, as well as
centuries of meddlesomeness from Great Britain
and Russia, culminated in an environment of dis-
dain towards the presence of foreign powers in the
region.
5. The 1979 Revolution: Rebellion Against
Foreign Intervention
The 1979 Iranian Revolution was initially un-
tethered to a religious cause. The revolution
served as a call-to-arms for many unique groups
across the country from students to communists
to women and more. It was aimed at the evi-
dent U.S. influence within the Pahlavi regime and
Iran overall. Ruhollah Khomeini quickly rose as
the leading opposition to the Shah, fomenting na-
tionalist sentiment within the population that took
a direct attack to foreign influence, particularly
in regard to the United States. He saw himself
as a “vanguard” of the “universal class” and pro-
moted a widespread message that served as a call
to arms for many different groups of people.23
This push against the United States by Khomeini’s
populist uprising served as the most outward re-
jection of American influence within Iran. While
interactions with the Shah had not always gone ac-
cording to U.S. interests, the Pahlavi Dynasty was
the United States’ best option for influence in the
23Maryam Panah, The Islamic Republic and the World:
Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution (Pluto Press,
2007), 50.
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country. The 1979 Revolution disrupted this influ-
ence and pushed the United States to evaluate its
strategy for the region.
In the public sphere, the United States made
apparent its condemnation of the revolution. U.S.
officials were both upset by the anti-American
nature of the revolution, as well as its religious
rhetoric that set the new Khomeini regime as anti-
thetical to the heralded Christian values of Amer-
ica. In a more economic sense, Americans were
also concerned by unrest in the country disrupt-
ing American business interests and oil produc-
tion. A 1978 New York Times article writes,
“The upheaval has already meant the loss of bil-
lions of dollars in military orders, property dam-
age and delayed payments and has caused worries
about loans made by American banks.”24 While
the early stages of the revolution certainly inter-
fered with the success of American foreign pol-
icy in the region, the most public and concerning
event for U.S. officials was yet to come.
6. The Iranian Hostage Crisis
On November 4, 1979 an Iranian stu-
dent group, the Muslim Student Followers of
the Imam’s Line, infiltrated the U.S. embassy
in Tehran and took American embassy staff
hostage.25 With support from Ayatollah Khome-
ini, they demanded that the Shah be returned to
Iran from the United States.26 This event sparked
a stark change in rhetoric regarding the U.S.’s
opinion on the revolution. While mostly quiet
about the early stages of the event, President
Jimmy Carter was quick to react publicly to the
hostage situation. Occurring from November 4,
24Ann Crittenden, “Iran Unrest a Nightmare For Many
U.S. Concerns: Other Major Arms Deals Dropped Turmoil
in Iran Hurts U.S. Companies Problems for Smaller Compa-
nies,” The New York Times, 1978.
25“Significant Dates in the Hostage Crisis,” The New York
Times, 1981.
26“Teheran Students Seize U.S. Embassy and Hold
Hostages,” The New York Times, November 5, 1979, sec.
Archives.
1979 to January 20, 1981, this 444-day event fur-
ther sparked outrage from America.27 Just two
days after the event began, President Jimmy Carter
wrote personally to Ayatollah Khomeini to ask
for the release of the U.S. hostages. He fur-
ther wrote, “The people of the United States de-
sire to have relations with Iran based upon equal-
ity, mutual respect, and friendship.”28 The mes-
sage from the Iranian student group who orches-
trated the hostage crisis was clear, however, that
they disagreed with Carter’s outlook on the U.S.-
Iranian relations, for the past, present, and fu-
ture. The group, known as the Followers of the
Imam’s Line, responded to the meetings between
American diplomats and the revolutionary Iranian
government with a radio broadcast stating, “Can
we forget all the U.S. agents who’ve been the
worst kind of criminals and now they send these
dirty characters?”29 The hostage crisis demon-
strated that U.S. relations with the Iranian people
had substantially degraded over the past decade,
stemming from the 1953 Coup and the resulting
growing distrust of foreign powers in the country.
The Iran hostage crisis had an indisputably
negative affect on U.S. domestic policy, specif-
ically in the 1980 presidential election. As
the hostage crisis stretched on through the final
years of Carter’s presidency, it weighed heav-
ily on his reelection chances. Interestingly, af-
ter the November election, religious leader Hojat
ul-Islam Asghar Mousavi Khoeiny was quoted as
saying, “We would have reached a solution ear-
lier if Carter, who was already in power, had been
elected...With Reagan’s victory, this will need a
long time.”30 Despite the fact that Iran publicly
held a stance wavering between apathy and annoy-
ance at the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the
27“Significant Dates in the Hostage Crisis.”
28Jimmy Carter, “Letter from Jimmy Carter to Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini Regarding the Release of the Iranian
Hostages,” November 6, 1979, National Archives.
29John Kifner, “Iran Demands Shah,” The New York
Times, November 8, 1979, sec. Archives.
30“Iran Says Reagan Victory Prolongs Hostage Crisis,”
The New York Times, 1980.
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hostage crisis came to a sudden end as he was be-
ing sworn into office. In a show of protest against
Jimmy Carter, who had long negotiated with the
hostage takers and confronted Iran about human
rights abuses, the hostages had been released sym-
bolically the moment Carter was no longer presi-
dent. In fact, senior U.S. politicians agreed that
the prolonged and unresolved nature of the crisis
had resulted in the loss of Jimmy Carter.31 To-
gether, the 1979 Revolution as well as the hostage
crisis sent a wave of disruption to U.S. foreign pol-
icy, as it was tied domestically to the presidential
election as well as on-the-ground in Iran.
7. Post-1979 Revolution: American Policy Dis-
turbance
Despite the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the
hostage crisis creating major tensions between the
two nations, it only served as a disturbance for the
United States’ overall mission of maintaining in-
fluence in the region. In fact, in President Jimmy
Carter’s 1980 State of the Union address, he reit-
erated the importance of the Persian Gulf region in
American policy and interests. He said, “Let our
position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any
outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf
region will be regarded as an assault on the vi-
tal interests of the United States of America.”32
The United States still managed to shape politics
and the economy within Iran. This is not to say
that the United States saw the Khomeini regime as
the ideal situation to facilitate their foreign policy
agenda within the country.
Khomeini’s pan-Islamic, anti-imperialist
rhetoric and ideology of exporting the revolu-
tion also served to threaten the U.S.’s ability to
maintain influence. A declassified 1980 CIA
document explains, “Iran’s efforts to export its
31“Carter Aide Ties Defeat To Hostage Crisis in Iran,” The
New York Times, 1980.
32Jimmy Carter, “Address by President Carter on the State
of the Union Before a Joint Session of Congress” (Speech,
Joint Session of Congress, Washington D.C., January 23,
1980).
revolution are a threat to key US interests. . .
Iranian-supported unrest could lead to sabotage
and strikes by oil workers, since Shias inhabit
many of the oil-producing areas of the Persian
Gulf states.”33 The impact of this statement is
two-fold. First, that the United States needed to
seek a way to suppress the influence of Iranian
Revolution on neighboring states. Secondly, a
key goal of U.S. influence remained maintaining
a position in the Persian Gulf that would be eco-
nomically beneficial in regard to the oil industry.
Although the nature of their interests in Iran was
shifting, the United States sought to maintain
influence through the destabilization of Iranian
hegemony. In response to the hostage crisis, the
United States had begun implementing a system
of sanctions against the country to try and exert
economic pressure and coercion for release of the
hostages.34 These sanctions would serve as the
basis of economic influence over Iran that would
persist into the twenty-first century. However,
the United States did not stop at sanctions in the
post-Revolutionary period and turned to more
drastic measures in an effort to contain the unrest
that had been fomented in Iran, as Panah explains.
In addition, there was an effort to regain influence
in the region through resetting the balance of
power.
8. Regional Disruption: U.S. Policy and the
Iran-Iraq War
The United States more aggressively disrupted
geo-politics in the region through their instigation
and aid in prolonging the Iran-Iraq War (1980-
1988). While the United States cannot be wholly
targeted as the sole reason for the outbreak of the
war, an analysis of weapons trading, regional po-
litical moves, and covert action reveals that the
U.S. played a major role in the conflict. In ad-
33National Foreign Assessment Center, Iran: Export-
ing the Revolution, Freedom of Information Act Electronic
Reading Room. 1980, iii.
34Panah, The Islamic Republic and the World, 76.
7
Stickel: U.S.--Iranian Relations 1953-2020
Published by eRepository @ Seton Hall, 2020
dition, to realign its influence within Iran, the U.S.
turned to regional destabilization through the in-
stigation of groups opposed to the revolution. A
Washington Post article reported on missions to
damage the image of Khomeini, “One was de-
signed to gather intelligence about Iran and sup-
port Iranian exiles.”35 In the post-Revolutionary
period, the United States took a covert, but ag-
gressive stance against the Iranian government and
sought to damage its image and influence through
covert missions not only in Iran, but also through-
out the Middle East. Thus, even prior to the Iran-
Iraq War and the Iran-Contra affair, the United
States worked tirelessly to influence the nature
of politics in Iran. The affair was just one part
of a larger seven-year mission to gain favor with
different aspects of Iranian government.36 One
specific instance even reflected the United States’
goal of communist repulsion within Iran wherein
the CIA released the names of KGB agents in Iran
to the Khomeini regime, resulting in the deaths
of around 200 people.37 This indicates that de-
spite the 1979 Revolution disrupting their immedi-
ate ability to continue exerting influence in Iran to
pursue their foreign policy goals and protect their
interests, the United States was quickly able to re-
gain the ability to affect the communist agenda
within Iran despite the disruption. In addition, al-
though the United States was opposed to Khome-
ini’s regime, it would play into its anti-Communist
nature to ensure that the U.S.’s own foreign policy
goals were met.
Simultaneous to maintaining influence within
Iran, as the previously mentioned CIA document
referred to, a key goal in U.S. foreign policy re-
garding Iran became the containment of revolu-
tionary sentiment. Khomeini had made clear his
hope to export the revolution into nearby Middle
35Bob Woodward, “CIA Curried Favor With Khomeini,
Exiles,” Washington Post, November 19, 1986, 2.
36Woodward, “CIA Curried Favor With Khomeini, Ex-
iles,” 1.
37Woodward, “CIA Curried Favor With Khomeini, Ex-
iles,” 2.
Eastern states through a policy of pan-Islamism.
The sincerity of Khomeini’s intentions, however,
were questioned and other rulers in the Middle
East feared that this sentiment would lead to the
demise of their regime. His rhetoric, “alarmed the
leaders of the Arab states, who feared for the secu-
rity of their own regimes.”38 To prevent the spread
of revolutionary sentiment, the United States be-
gan a period of what Maryam Panah refers to as
rapprochement with Iraq in the late 1970s in an
effort to not only reset the balance of power within
the region, but also in an effort to end the hostage
crisis post-1979.39 As tensions grew between Iraq
and Iran due to historical religious conflict as well
as territorial disputes, the United States facilitated
the sale of engines and jets to Iraq all while ac-
knowledging the strong probability of a war be-
tween the two nations.40
9. American Policy Exposed: The Iran-Contra
Affair
After growing tensions between the two coun-
tries erupted in 1980, resulting in what would be-
come a nearly decade-long military conflict, the
United States continued to support Iraq covertly
through weapons sales to Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein.41 However, in an effort to destabilize the
region the United States was also involved in sell-
ing weapons parts to Iran through an Israeli proxy
to fund the US-supported Contras in Nicaragua,
in what later would become known as the Iran-
Contra affair.42 In a 1992 New York Times article
a State Department official was quoted in regard
38William L. Cleveland and Martin P. Bunton, A History
of the Modern Middle East, vol. Fifth edition (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2013), 360.
39Panah, The Islamic Republic and the World, 79.
40Panah, The Islamic Republic and the World, 80. Also
see Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle
East, 431-432.
41Seymour Hersh, “U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early
in Its War Against Iran,” The New York Times, January 26,
1992, The New York Times Archive.
42Hersh, “U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War
Against Iran.”
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to the regional weapons trading as saying, “We
wanted to avoid victory by both sides.”43
The Iran-Contra affair was an example that
demonstrated the United States’ mission to hold
influence in Iran in the form of arms dealing and
regional destabilization. While the rhetoric main-
tained outwardly by American President Ronald
Reagan condemned Iran and supported Iraq in the
conflict, the covert actions revealed that the United
States had also been supporting Iran through il-
licit weapons trading that violated previously en-
acted embargoes and restrictions against the coun-
try. This further serves as evidence that through
covert weapons trading to both nations, the intent
of the United States was to continually destabi-
lize the region in an effort to suppress hegemonic
power by Iraq and Iran. With both countries weak-
ened, the United States would be able to possess
greater influence over oil in the region as well
as contain revolutionary sentiment from spreading
outside of Iran.
Spearheaded by the National Security Coun-
cil and the CIA, what was first referred to as the
Iran Initiative began in 1985 and first was targeted
at intelligence collection.44 The mission then suc-
cessively used Israel as a go-between for missile
transport to Iran and used the subsequent prof-
its to fund the Contras in Nicaragua.45 The Iran
Initiative missions took place despite the fact that
Iran had been subject to embargoes and sanctions
by the United States which should have prohib-
ited this action. An explanation for the Iran Initia-
tive and weapons trading despite public rhetoric
against Iran can be tied to multiple causes. First
and foremost, as a direct explanation to the rea-
sons behind the weapons dealing, the U.S. govern-
ment pointed towards the hostage crisis occurring
43Hersh, “U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War
Against Iran.”
44Central Intelligence Agency, Statement of William H.
Webster Regarding the Iran-Contra Matter, William Web-
ster. Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room,
1987.
45Central Intelligence Agency, Statement of William H.
Webster Regarding the Iran-Contra Matter.
in Lebanon at the time, which was thought to have
been potentially connected to Iran.46
However, more revealing are the National
Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) outlined
in the Report of the President’s Special Review
Board that list the key U.S. interests in Iran. The
1987 list mainly focuses on repelling communism,
securing economic/oil security through land and
political stability, as well as improving the human
rights situation in Iran. Notably mentioned are
the goals of: “preserving Iran as an independent
buffer between the Soviet Union and the Persian
Gulf,” “An early end to the Iran-Iraq war without
Soviet mediation or change in the regional balance
of power,” and “Movement toward the normaliza-
tion of Iranian-American relations.”47 There was
a clear opposition of opinions with whether the il-
licit sale of arms to Iran would truly further U.S.
interests. Early on, communiques between Caspar
Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense at the time,
and Robert McFarlane, the National Security Ad-
visor during the Iran-Contra deals, reveal Wein-
berger’s disagreement with the plan. He wrote that
the arms sales would lead to “a possible alteration
of the strategic balance in favor of Iran.”48 How-
ever, the Director of Central Intelligence made
clear his approval of the plan by writing that the
plan would, “enhance U.S. leverage in order to en-
sure that the USSR is not the primary beneficiary
of change and turmoil in this critical country.”49
The dialogues between various departments
and key figures within the Reagan administration
reveal the disagreement in how to best preserve
and pursue U.S. leverage and influence in Iran.
While some, such as Weinberger, viewed the plan
as unwise and a disruption of the balance of power,
46President’s Special Review Board, Report of the Presi-
dent’s Special Review Board, Edmund Muskie, John Tower,
and Brent Snowcroft. 1987, I-1.
47President’s Special Review Board, Report of the Presi-
dent’s Special Review Board, B-8.
48President’s Special Review Board, Report of the Presi-
dent’s Special Review Board, B-10.
49President’s Special Review Board, Report of the Presi-
dent’s Special Review Board, B-10.
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the Director of Central Intelligence viewed it as
a way to maintain the U.S. interest in the con-
tainment of communism. As evidenced by his-
tory, the plan resulted in a large scandal for the
Reagan administration as it revealed the lack of
agreement and communication between not only
the different branches of the United States Intelli-
gence Community, but also the different branches
of government as Congress was left uninformed
until the information leak. The Iran-Contra affair
revealed how the U.S. would have to decide be-
tween pursuing different interests, such as the re-
pulsion of communism or maintaining balance of
power, with an Iranian regime that was not openly
diplomatic and friendly towards America.
10. Khatami’s Dialogue of Civilizations: Ira-
nian Policy into the 90s
The relationship between Iran and the United
States entered a period of rapprochement in the
late 1990s. With the election of Iranian Presi-
dent Khatami in 1997, Iranian foreign policy to-
wards the United States took on a more diplo-
matic nature. President Khatami was noted for
his popular statement of, “We want to have a dia-
logue of civilizations.”50 Despite the fact that Iran
had been sanctioned by the United States since
the Iranian Revolution, Khatami sought open di-
alogue with the United States in an attempt to al-
leviate tensions between the two countries. How-
ever, Khatami’s proverbial olive branch did not
majorly change the outlook of the United States
on the region. While Khatami attempted to reopen
dialogue with the United States, the U.S. contin-
ued to reinforce its Middle Eastern allies.51 Sim-
ilar to the isolationist policies in response to the
1979 Revolution, the United States sought to con-
tain the influence of Iran. The containment of Iran
intended to ensure that Iran did not disrupt the bal-
50Douglas Jehl, “Iranian President Calls for Opening Dia-
logue with U.S.,” The New York Times, December 15, 1997,
sec. World.
51“President Khatami Addresses America,” The New York
Times, January 8, 1998, sec. Opinion.
ance of power in the region as well as protect U.S.
regional interests such as oil.
11. Further Disruption: Bush’s Axis of Evil
George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union
speech, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
added vitriol to the rhetoric of the United States
towards Iran. During this speech, Bush used the
phrase “Axis of evil” to refer to several countries
around the globe, Iran included. The main topic
of the State of the Union was the recent 9/11 at-
tacks and the efforts of the United States against
terrorism. As President Bush described, the “Axis
of evil” were states that supported terror groups
as well as were threats to America.52 Specifi-
cally related to Iran, Bush stated, “Iran aggres-
sively pursues these weapons [of mass destruc-
tion] and exports terror, while an unelected few
repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom.”53
It set Iran, as well as Iraq and North Korea as
enemies of the United States and antithetical the
American ideal of freedom and peace. In re-
sponse, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi
was quoted by CNN as saying, “The Islamic Re-
public of Iran considers these remarks as inter-
ference in its internal affairs.” Interestingly, this
calls back to Iranian rejection of foreign influence,
specifically American influence, within its internal
affairs. Iran viewed Bush’s comments as an attack
on its sovereignty. Interestingly, there was inter-
nal debate within Bush’s press team on whether
or not to include Iran within the “Axis of evil” as
the country and Bush made the final decision to
keep the country on the list.54 Including Iran in
the “Axis of evil” served to instigate further ag-
gression between the two countries as well as hurt
52George Bush, “President Bush’s 2002 State of the
Union Address” (State of the Union Address, Joint Session
of Congress, Washington D.C., January 29, 2002).
53George Bush, “President Bush’s 2002 State of the
Union Address.”
54Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham, “What the
Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran,” Middle East Journal 61,
no. 3 (2007): 421–40, 423.
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American public opinion of Iran by portraying the
country as an aggressor, antithetical to U.S. inter-
ests.55
In the years following, the “Axis of evil”
speech had an impact on the significant cool-
ing of relations between the two countries. An-
other factor in this cooling was the presidency
of Iranian Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a conserva-
tive who opposed the United States. Much of Ah-
madinejad’s rhetoric was inflammatory towards
the United States and sought to goad George W.
Bush into public debates. One example of this
was Ahmadinejad’s proposed debate against Bush
at the United Nations General Assembly meeting.
A 2006 CNN article wrote, “Ahmadinejad himself
has taken steps to engage the president, sending
him a letter earlier this year and, late last month,
calling for a ”direct television debate” between the
leaders.”56 Much of Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric also
pertained to tensions surrounding the Iranian nu-
clear program. The United States was growing
concerned over the potentiality of a nuclear Iran.
In a break from George W. Bush’s policies, the
following American presidency of Barack Obama
would confront this issue on a diplomatic, multi-
national effort.
12. Nuclear Talks: The JCPOA
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) was agreed upon on July 14, 2015 and
was adopted on October 18, 2015.57 The JCPOA
marked a turn in the United States’ rhetoric to-
wards Iran. A significant shift from the policies of
George W. Bush, Obama-era foreign policy that
was oriented towards Iran sought renewed coop-
eration on the public, international stage. The
central point of President Barack Obama’s re-
55Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham, “What the
Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran,” 425.
56“No ‘steel-Cage, Grudge Match’ between Bush, Ah-
madinejad,” CNN, September 7, 2006.
57“Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) Archive and Joint Com-
prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Archive,” U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury, accessed April 20, 2020.
newed Middle East policy was the use of coercive
diplomacy to promote the denuclearization of Iran
rather than Bush’s use of inflammatory rhetoric to-
wards the country. This effort served to restore
the balance of power in the region, as it would
be in the U.S.’s interest to restrict the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons, particularly in Iran. Pres-
ident Barack Obama stated, “Make no mistake: A
nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge that can be
contained.”58 The JCPOA would allow for a re-
laxation of economic sanctions against Iran in ex-
change for strict limitations on their nuclear stock-
pile and uranium development capabilities.
The JCPOA, in fact, aligned with previous
policies that sought to maintain American influ-
ence in Iran. As the United States was the main
sanctioning force against Iran, the lifting of these
sanctions would increase Iranian public approval
of the American government.59 In addition, the
reopening of economic trade between the two
nations would be favorable to the United States
economy. These economic benefits would in-
crease U.S. influence over Iran, aligning with the
overarching U.S. goal of maintaining influence in
the country. The JCPOA also allowed for the
United States to be a core creator of the conditions
under which the Iranian nuclear program would
be limited in its scope.60 It also placed a great
amount of power into the hands of the United
Nations Security Council as well as a newly cre-
ated Joint Commission, removing Iran’s sovereign
power over its nuclear program and placing it into
the hands of an international body in which the
United States was immensely powerful.61
The JCPOA represents an important point in
post-1979 U.S.-Iranian foreign policy. The period
58Obama Warns Iran on Nukes (United Nations: Associ-
ated Press, 2012).
59“Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),”
July 14, 2015, Iran Sanctions, U.S. Department of State,
Main Text, 14.
60“Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),”
Annex III, 1.
61“Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),”
Annex IV, 1.
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following the 1979 Revolution was hallmarked
by an outward condemnation of the Iranian gov-
ernment while declassified documents revealed
covert relations between the two countries, such
as in the Iran-Contra affair. Political sway was
maintained, as the Iran-Iraq War demonstrates,
primarily through U.S. influence on the balance
of power within the region. While this period
was overtly aggressive and anti-Iranian, Obama-
era policy demonstrates a shift in public rhetoric
to realign U.S. policy. While the intended out-
come did not change, the JCPOA maintained the
policy of influence in the region, the approach
was markedly different. This also aligned with
Obama’s broader foreign policy of multilateral ac-
tion and withdrawal of troops from the Middle
East region.
In a sharp departure from previous presiden-
tial policy, Donald Trump dismantled the JCPOA
and moved to return to a more outwardly antago-
nistic relationship with Iran. As President Trump
had voiced his opposition to the deal early on in
his presidency and in 2018 he fully withdrew the
United States from the deal.62 While at the time
all other parties stated they would remain com-
pliant, the withdrawal of the United States placed
stress upon the main appeal of the deal which was
the removal of U.S. sanctions from Iran. The pres-
ident repeatedly referred to the JCPOA as “a hor-
rible one-sided deal that should have never, ever
been made.”63 He opposed the deal, stating that it
did not do enough to halt nuclear development and
that it ignored the political wrongdoings of Iran.64
Opinions in America over the withdrawal from the
nuclear deal were mixed, with some agreeing that
the deal had been unfavorable to the U.S. while
others believing that the deal was integral for the
62Mark Landler, “Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He
Long Scorned,” The New York Times, May 8, 2018, sec.
World.
63Mark Landler, “Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He
Long Scorned.”
64Rick Gladstone, “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal? And
Why Does Trump Hate It?,” The New York Times, October
5, 2017, sec. World.
effective denuclearization of Iran.
13. Relation Deterioration: Trump’s Presi-
dency
While relations between Iran and the United
States had been deteriorating since the U.S.’s with-
drawal from the JCPOA and the growing non-
compliance of Iran in reaction, overt military ac-
tion immediately brought tensions to a head.65
The assassination of Qasem Soleimani on Jan-
uary 3, 2020 through a direct order from President
Donald Trump caused shock worldwide.66 The
attack occurred on Iraqi soil, striking the Bagh-
dad International Airport and killing three Irani-
ans and two Iraqi officials.67 President Trump
rationalized the strike by stating that “Suleimani
was plotting imminent and sinister attacks on
American diplomats and military personnel.”68
Despite this statement, many American officials
as well as Iranian officials doubted the veracity
of the reasoning and were unsure that Soleimani
had actually been plotting any action against the
United States. Deeper analysis into the decision
to airstrike Qasem Soleimani is limited due to the
confidential nature of relevant documents as well
as the lack of information and intelligence that has
been made available through public statements.
In reaction to the assassination, tensions im-
mediately escalated between the two countries to
a point of near war. Iran reacted with a strike on
a U.S. military base in Iraq that did not kill any-
65“Iran News: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani An-
nounces Partial Withdrawal from 2015 Nuclear Deal,” ac-
cessed April 24, 2020.
66“Outrage in Iran After Killing of Suleimani: Here’s
What You Need to Know,” The New York Times, January
5, 2020, sec. World.
67Tom O’Connor and James Laporta, “Trump Orders U.S.
Drone Strike Killing Iranian General Who Had ‘Plans to
Attack’ American Diplomats and Military,” Newsweek, Jan-
uary 2, 2020.
68“The Killing of Gen. Qassim Suleimani: What We
Know Since the U.S. Airstrike,” The New York Times, Jan-
uary 3, 2020, sec. World.
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one.69 These actions only added to the tension
that had been growing since Trump took office.
As an article from Al Jazeera hypothesized that
Trump’s actions, “weakened reformist forces who
favour integration with the world and emboldened
political factions who advocate against normal-
ising ties with Western countries.”70 In addition,
Iran immediately announced that it would aban-
don compliance on one of the main tenets of the
JCPOA which was the “limitations in production”
of uranium.71 Rhetoric around the U.S. being an
unfair foreign influence in the country also rose
yet again as citizens complained that U.S. sanc-
tions and economic coercion had resurged dur-
ing Trump’s presidency to negatively affect Iran.72
Adding to this rise in tensions between the two
countries was the deployment of 3,000 U.S. troops
to the Middle East immediately following the air
strike on Soleimani.73 This increased the senti-
ment that there was a probable impending armed
engagement between the two nations.
While there are doubts regarding a recent plot
against the United States, actions in Soleimani’s
past have demonstrated a persistent threat to U.S.
interests in Iran and the Middle East. Soleimani
had been an adversary of American interests for
years in the Middle East. As the head of the Quds
Force, Soleimani had facilitated the weaponiza-
tion of insurgency forces around the region that
have been in opposition to U.S. interests.74 For
example, in 2016 Soleimani had sought to sup-
69Tara Kangarlou, “Despair, Defiance in Iran after US
Killing of Qassem Soleimani,” Al Jazeera, February 4, 2020.
70Kangarlou, “Despair, Defiance in Iran after US Killing
of Qassem Soleimani.”
71“Outrage in Iran After Killing of Suleimani: Here’s
What You Need to Know,” The New York Times, January
5, 2020, sec. World.
72Kangarlou, “Despair, Defiance in Iran after US Killing
of Qassem Soleimani,” Al Jazeera, February 4, 2020.
73Paul Shinkman, “Trump to Send 3,000 More Troops to
Middle East Amid Iran Escalation,” US News & World Re-
port, January 3, 2020.
74Thomas Erdbrink, “Iranian General, Denouncing Move
by Bahrain, Threatens ‘Bloody Intifada,’” The New York
Times, June 21, 2016, sec. World.
port Bahraini insurgents which may have endan-
gered the United States Fifth fleet in the country.75
However, Soleimani also worked with the United
States at times. In the wake of 9/11 Soleimani
aided the United States by working alongside
the U.S. to combat the Taliban.76 That rela-
tionship shifted for the worse following George
Bush’s speech on the “axis of evil.”77 Throughout
Soleimani’s time with the Quds Force, he worked
to further Iranian interests with some of his ac-
tions directly interfering or even harming Ameri-
can interests in the Middle East. During the Iraq
war, Soleimani was responsible for many attacks
against American forces.78 In response to these
actions and others, the United States reacted by
assigning the Quds Force the classification of a
terrorist group.79
So, while a strong argument could be
made that the airstrike assassination of Qasem
Soleimani was antagonistic, short-sighted, and ill-
advised, it was not completely out of line with
past American action. While this direct strike on
Soleimani was certainly the most direct and overt
act of aggression between the two countries, it was
not without precedent. In cases throughout the
history of relations between the two countries, the
United States has acted against Iranian leadership
when its interests were threatened. However, this
action certainly deviates from previous intentions
to work diplomatically with Iran, such as in the
case of the JCPOA. The outwardly aggressive na-
ture of the airstrike set a new tone for U.S.-Iranian
relations. The act maintained the trend American
action taken to protect U.S. interests in the region,
75Erdbrink, “Iranian General, Denouncing Move by
Bahrain, Threatens ‘Bloody Intifada.’”
76Aaron Blake, “When the United States and Qasem
Soleimani Worked Together,” The Washington Post, January
3, 2020.
77Blake, “When the United States and Qasem Soleimani
Worked Together.”
78“Iran’s Qasem Soleimani: Why the US Had Him in Its
Sights,” BBC News, January 3, 2020, sec. Middle East.
79“Iran’s Qasem Soleimani: Why the US Had Him in Its
Sights.”
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but in a markedly different way than years past.
In regard to the Soleimani airstrike, relations
between Iran and the United States may take on
a more overtly aggressive direction as we move
further into the twenty-first century. If President
Donald Trump is reelected, tensions between the
two countries may continue to rise. While aggres-
sive rhetoric and covert action is not a new oc-
currence in the history of U.S.-Iranian relations,
the measure to publicly assassinate a high-ranking
member of the Iranian government was a large de-
viation from the past. While the full extent of
CIA and Trump policy operation within Iran is not
yet known due to its classified nature, the United
States, however, will most likely maintain their
half a century long trend of pursuance of main-
taining influence in the region.
14. Conclusion
While the interests of the United States have
changed over the years, the U.S. has consistently
tried to maintain their grip in Iran to pursue for-
eign policy goals. In the 1950s, those goals in-
cluded favorable oil settlements and the repulsion
of communism. With the 1979 Iranian Revolu-
tion the U.S.-backed Shah was ousted. This event
served as a disruption to the U.S.’s ability to di-
rectly influence the Iranian government. How-
ever, the U.S. continued to exert influence through
contact with the Khomeini regime as well as the
use of regional state and non-state actors to ap-
ply further pressure on the newly formed govern-
ment. As the nature of relations shifted, the United
States moved to maintain influence through re-
gional disruption in the Iran-Iraq War. Using sanc-
tions and embargoes, the United States was able to
apply pressure on Iran economically while George
W. Bush’s rhetoric did so politically. During the
presidency of Barack Obama, this economic pres-
sure was used to sway the Iranian government into
signing the JCPOA, pursuing the U.S. interest of
nuclear containment in Iran. Finally, throughout
the Trump presidency, the influence of the United
States has mainly been exerted through hostile
rhetoric and aggressive military and foreign pol-
icy action. While there have been differences in
action due to changing agendas and opinions of
presidents throughout American history, all have
consistently worked to maintain U.S. influence in
Iran in the pursuit of interest-based foreign policy.
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